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ABSTRACT
Dollarization has been suggested as a policy that might, among other goals, promote trade
between a country adopting the dollar and the United States. Evidence supporting this conjecture could
be drawn from a recent series of papers by Rose and co-authors who show that a currency union increases
bilateral trade among its members, and that this effect is both large and statistically significant. In this
paper we show that this result is not robust if we consider bilateral United States trade (even though the
United States accounts for 60 percent of all observations of currency unions between industrial and non-
industrial countries), nor if we consider bilateral trade of countries that have adopted the United States
dollar, like Panama. Furthermore, the effect of dollarization on trade with the United States is not
statistically distinct from the effect of a fixed dollar exchange rate on trade with the United States.
Michael W. Klein





I.  Introduction 
 
In the ongoing controversy over the appropriate exchange rate regime, events of 
the 1990s have led some to the “bipolar view” that countries should either allow their 
currencies to float or opt for a hard peg, like a currency union or dollarization.
1  The hard 
peg option is seen as having two potential benefits; providing a nominal anchor for 
macroeconomic stability, and fostering trade integration between an emerging market 
country and the industrial country to which it links its currency.
2  
The conjecture that currency unions foster trade integration could be supported by 
reference to a series of papers solely authored and also co-authored by Andrew Rose.
3  
Rose and his co-authors demonstrate that membership in a currency union has a large, 
statistically significant effect on bilateral trade patterns.  Using data sets with tens of 
thousands, or even hundreds of thousands, of observations on the volume of bilateral 
trade, and augmenting a gravity model analysis with a dummy variable that indicates 
membership in a currency union, a typical result is that the coefficient on the currency 
                                                 
1 Stanley Fischer (2001) offers an overview of this debate.  It is worth noting at the outset that a 
currency union and dollarization are conceptually distinct.  A currency union involves the 
establishment of a new central bank that may be administered by representatives from all 
countries using the new transnational currency.  Dollarization, in contrast, implies the adoption of 
the currency of another country (typically the US dollar).  While “currency unions” between non-
industrial countries and either the United States or Australia are better characterized as cases of 
dollarization, we will use these terms interchangeably.  
 
2  For example, Andrew Berg and Eduardo Borensztein (2000) write  “Dollarization may also 
bring other benefits: closer integration with both the United States and the global economy would 
be promoted by lower transaction costs and an assured stability of prices in dollar terms.”  
Rudiger Dornbusch (2001) writes “There is a whole range of economies that are doing all right 
(say, Hungary or Mexico) that would benefit from the immediate introduction of currency boards 
to deepen economic integration and hence build much better growth prospects.” (p. 242).   
Alberto Alesina and Robert Barro (2001) state that Mexico and many Central American should be 
interested in dollarization, based on, among other factors, their trade with the United States. 
 
3These include Andrew Rose (2000), Jeffrey Frankel and Rose (forthcoming), Reuven Glick and 
Rose (forthcoming), and Rose and Eric van Wincoop (2001). 
  2 
union dummy variable is highly significant and its value suggests that membership in a 
currency union, ceteris paribus, nearly quadruples bilateral trade.
4  Based on these 
results, Rose and van Wincoop (2001) conclude that “Reducing these [trade] barriers 
through currency unions like EMU or dollarization in the Americas will thus result in 
increased international trade.”  Frankel and Rose (forthcoming) offer estimates 
suggesting that dollarization would raise the trade-to-GDP ratio substantially in many 
Western Hemisphere countries.
5 
  In this paper, we show that there is little robust evidence that dollarization 
promotes greater trade with the United States, especially among those countries that are 
the most likely candidates for dollarization.
6  These results contrast with those of Rose 
and his co-authors.  The source of this difference is that this paper focuses on bilateral 
trade for sets of dyads in which one country is the United States or sets of dyads in which 
one country has a currency union with the United States (e.g., Panama).  In the face of 
possible parameter heterogeneity, results from these sub-samples offer a more precise 
gauge of the effect of dollarization than do results from the much wider samples used by 
                                                 
4 For example, Frankel and Rose (forthcoming) present an estimated coefficient on the currency 
union dummy variable of 1.38 in their Table 1, with an associated standard error of 0.19.  This 
result suggests that membership in a currency union raises bilateral trade by a factor of 3.97, 
ceteris paribus, since the regressand is the logarithm of trade and e
1.38=3.97.  This result is cited 
in Rose and van Wincoop (2001). 
 
5 See their Table V.  Some estimates include an increase in trade-to-GDP of 39 percentage points 
in Guatemala, 24 percentage points in Chile, 91 percentage points in Costa Rica, 7 percentage 
points in Brazil and 93 percentage points in Mexico. 
 
6 Other work that revisits the analysis of the effect of membership in a currency union on trade 
includes Volker Nitsch (forthcoming, 2002a, 2002b), Torsten Persson (2001), Michael Pakko and 
Howard Wall (2001) and Silvana Tenreyro (2001).  Sebastian Edwards (2001) presents evidence 
on other effects of dollarization, including inflation performance, growth, fiscal performance and 
the incidence of major current account reversals. 
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Rose and his co-authors.
7  It is worth noting that dyads that include the United States 
account for 60 percent of the cases of currency unions between industrial and non-
industrial countries that have complete data and can be used in the empirical analysis.
8  In 
fact, the only industrial country other than the United States that has usable data for 
sustained currency unions with more than one country in the post-Bretton Woods era is 
Australia, which had currency unions with the small island nations of Kiribati, the 
Solomon Islands and Tonga.  Dyads including Australia represent another 25 percent of 
all dyads with currency unions between industrial and non-industrial countries.  
   One might expect to find larger estimates of the effect of currency unions on trade 
in the sub-sample of dyads in which one country is the United States, as compared to the 
wider samples used by Rose and his co-authors, since, presumably, countries in sustained 
dollar currency unions are those that most benefit from membership and increased trade 
with the United States is one such benefit.  However, this is not the case.  For example, as 
shown in Section II.1, the coefficient on the currency union dummy variable is highly 
significant for the full sample, and even larger and almost as significant for trade between 
industrial and non-industrial countries.  But, as shown in Section II.2, the coefficient on 
the currency union dummy variable is only about one-third as large using the sample of 
                                                 
7 A related question linked to the issue of parameter stability across subsets of the wide sample 
has to do with the likely trade effects of EMU.  The only observations in the samples used by 
Rose and his co-authors that represent a currency union between industrial countries are those of 
trade between Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland.  Rodney Thom and Brendan Walsh 
(2001) conclude that this currency union had only a negligible effect on trade, a result that Glick 
and Rose (forthcoming) maintain “cannot be reasonably generalized.” (p. 9).  Nitsch (2002b) 
concludes that the currency union between Belgium and Luxembourg did not lead to a significant 
increase in trade between these countries. 
 
8 Here, countries with an IFS identification number less than 200 are classified as “Industrial” 
while those with an IFS identification number greater than 200 are classified as “Non-Industrial.”  
See the appendix for a list of “Industrial” and “Non-Industrial” countries. 
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dyads in which one country is the United States.  This coefficient is not significant at the 
5 percent level for all United States bilateral trade, and it is not significant at the 10 
percent level when we slightly modify the way in which one of the control variables is 
defined, or when we restrict the sample to all United States trade with non-industrial 
countries.  If we hone in even more closely on a sub-sample that reflects current and 
potential candidates for dollarization, by considering dyads consisting of the United 
States and other Western Hemisphere countries (a sub-sample that consists of almost 90 
percent of the actual currency union observations for the United States), we find that the 
currency union coefficient is about one-fifth of its full sample value and is not significant 
at the 25 percent level.  Furthermore, as shown in Section II.3, regressions using dyads 
centered on countries that had a currency union with the United States fail to offer 
significant coefficients on currency unions.   
The regressions presented in Section II.4 consider the effect of a sustained fixed 
dollar exchange rate, as well as a currency union, on trade with the United States.  The 
inclusion of the dummy variable for a fixed dollar exchange rate raises the significance of 
the currency union dummy variable, but not beyond the 20 percent level for a regression 
using the sample consisting of trade between the United States and other Western 
Hemisphere countries.   These regressions also show that dollarization does not have an 
effect on trade with the United States that is statistically distinct from the effect of 
maintaining a fixed dollar exchange rate, even though it is often maintained that 
dollarization is somehow different than a fixed exchange rate along this dimension.  
  The one case in which we do find a robust effect of dollarization on trade is for 
currency unions with the Australian dollar rather than the greenback.  These results are  5 
presented in Section II.5.  But, as noted above, this result is based on currency unions for 
three very small island nations and one may not want to generalize this result.   
  
II. Currency Unions and Bilateral Trade 
The basic approach used to determine whether a currency union promotes trade, 
first employed by Rose (2000), is to augment a gravity model of trade flows with a 
dummy variable representing membership in a currency union.  The time-series cross-
section model has, as its dependent variable, the logarithm of bilateral trade denominated 
in thousands of real American dollars.  The regressors include, along with a dummy 
variable indicating membership in a currency union, the logarithm of distance between 
the countries, the logarithm of the product of their real national incomes, the logarithm of 
the product of their real per capita national income, the logarithm of the product of their 
land areas and dummy variables representing the presence of a common border, a 
common language, a free trade agreement, a common colonizer, political union, and 
whether one country is an ex-colony of another.  The specification of all of the 
regressions in this paper replicates the functional form used in Glick and Rose 
(forthcoming) that includes, along with these regressors, fixed effects for years.
 9   The 
data set used in this paper, which is from Glick and Rose (forthcoming), includes annual 
observations on 165 countries (27 industrial countries and 138 non-industrial countries).
10   
                                                 
9 Rose states on his website that he is most favorably disposed towards the fixed effects method 
used in Glick and Rose (forthcoming).  Two authors applying alternative estimation methods to 
these data are Persson (2001), who uses a matching technique, and Tenereyro (2001) who 
corrects for possible sample selection bias. 
 
10 Rose makes other data sets on currency unions and trade available on his website but he states 
that these data have been the most extensively checked.  As noted in Glick and Rose 
(forthcoming), there are many gaps in the data due to both missing data and values of trade that  6 
Glick and Rose (forthcoming) use data from 1948 to 1997, but in this paper we focus on 
data from the post-Bretton Woods period and all regressions use data from 1974 to 1997, 
inclusive.
11     
 
II. 1  Full Sample Results 
We begin by presenting two regressions, one that uses the full sample of dyads 
and another in which the sample consists of dyads representing trade between industrial 
countries and non-industrial countries.  Table 1 reports the estimates from these 
regressions, with the full sample results in Column I and the results from the regression 
using the sub-sample consisting of trade between industrial countries and non-industrial 
countries in Column II.  This table also reports the number of total observations used in 
the regression, the number of observations in which there is a currency union between 
two countries, the percentage of total observations accounted for by dyads with a 
currency union, and the geometric average of the bilateral trade variable.   
The results in this table are typical of those presented by Rose and his co-authors.  
For the full sample (Column I), the coefficient on the currency union dummy variable 
equals 1.52 and the associated t-statistic is 9.11.  This result suggests that a currency 
union increases trade by a factor of 4.57 (exp(1.52) = 4.57), ceteris paribus.  This result 
is based on a sample with 152,960 observations, representing trade flows among 165 
                                                                                                                                                 
equal zero which, when the logarithm of trade is calculated, are set to missing.  The appendix lists 
the countries represented in the data set. 
 
11 We focus on the post-1973 period since the effects of dollarization on trade would likely be 
stronger when the rest of the world is not on a dollar-based exchange rate standard since, after the 
Bretton Woods era, there is a greater distinction between dollarization and the exchange rate 
arrangements of the rest of the world. 
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countries, a sample that includes 1,783 dyads with currency unions (1.17 percent of the 
total sample).  As shown in Column II, the estimated effect of a currency union on trade 
between industrial and non-industrial countries is even larger, increasing that trade by a 
factor of  5.53 (= exp(1.71)), ceteris paribus. The coefficient on the currency union 
dummy variable is significant at more than the 99 percent level of confidence in this 
sample, which includes 65,059 observations, with 175 of them representing dyads in 
which there is a currency union (0.27 percent of the sample).  In both regressions, almost 
all the other regressors are significant at the 99 percent level of confidence.   
 
II. 2  Dollar Currency Unions and United States Bilateral Trade  
We next consider a sample in which each observation represents trade between 
the United States and another country.  This sample selection enables us to gauge more 
precisely, in the face of possible parameter heterogeneity, the effects of dollarization on 
trade.  To begin, we list in Table 2 all the countries that had a currency union with the 
United States in the post-Bretton Woods era and that had data for all variables used in the 
regression, and the years during which they had a currency union with the United States.  
For the sake of completeness, we also list all other currency unions in the post-1973 
sample in which one of the countries is an industrial country and for which complete data 
are available such that the observations can be included in the regression analysis.
12  As 
shown in Table 2, the countries that joined currency unions with industrial countries were 
                                                 
12 Observations in the data set that represent currency unions between industrial and non-
industrial countries in the post-Bretton Woods era, but do not have complete data, include three 
currency unions involving the United Kingdom (with the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar and St. 
Helena), two currency unions involving Australia (with Nauru and with Tuvalu), and the currency 
unions between the United States and Guam, and between France and St. Pierre & Miquelon.  
  8 
generally quite small.  Among the usable, post-1973 data, dyads that include currency 
unions with the United States account for 60 percent of all dyads between industrial 
countries and non-industrial countries in which there is a currency union, and dyads that 
include currency unions with Australia account for another 25 percent of the total.   
Table 3 reports the results for gravity equations augmented with a currency union 
dummy variable in which each dyad includes the United States as one of the trade 
partners.  Columns I.a and I.b in this table report regressions in which the sample 
includes United States bilateral trade with all countries in the sample.  The first column 
uses the Glick and Rose data without modification.  In this case, the coefficient on the 
currency union dummy variable is 0.50, with an associated p-value of 0.065.  Thus, this 
estimate suggests that a U.S. dollar currency union increases trade by 65 percent 
(exp(0.5)=1.65), but this result, significant at the 93.5% level of confidence, is much less 
precise than those from the full sample cited above.   
This result, however, is sensitive to a slight modification of the value of the 
dummy variable that represents whether one country in the dyad was a former colony of 
the other country in the dyad.  In the Glick and Rose data set, the ex-Colony dummy 
variable equals 1 for two sets of dyads involving the United States: the United States and 
the Philippines and the United States and the United Kingdom.  In the Column I.b in 
Table 3, we modify this definition of ex-Colony for the United States by including both 
the United States – United Kingdom dyad as a separate dummy variable and by scoring 
the Unite States – Liberia dyad as one representing a former colonial relationship.
13  The 
                                                 
13 Liberia, the only country outside the Western Hemisphere that had a currency union with the 
United States in the post-Bretton Woods era, was founded in 1822 as a result of the efforts of the 
American Colonization Society to settle freed American slaves in West Africa.  Over the course 
of forty years, about 12,000 slaves were voluntarily relocated. The colony became the Free and  9 
results in this column suggest that it is important to separate a dummy variable for United 
States – United Kingdom trade from that of the other two colonial relationships since the 
coefficient on the US – UK trade dummy variable is negative whereas the coefficient on 
the newly defined ex-Colony dummy variable is positive, and both coefficients are 
significant at better than the 99 percent level of confidence.   But more to the point, with 
the inclusion of Liberia as an ex-colony of the United States, the coefficient on the 
currency union dummy is no longer significant at standard levels of confidence, with its 
p-value equal to 0.146 and its value falling by 30 percent to 0.35.
14  
Most of the countries that are seen as potential candidates for dollarization are 
non-industrial countries.  Column II of Table 3 investigates the estimated effect of 
currency unions on trade between the United States and non-industrial countries.
15  The 
sample used in this regression includes 2,870 observations, which is 83 percent of the 
number of observations in Column I, but with the same 105 dyads representing currency 
unions as in the regressions reported in Column I.  Note that the average level of trade 
between the United States and non-industrial countries is almost twice that of the average 
level of trade between all industrial countries and non-industrial countries.  Comparing 
the regression results in Column II with those in Column I.a (since we keep the original 
                                                                                                                                                 
Independent Republic of Liberia in 1847.  The English-speaking Americo-Liberians, descendants 
of former American slaves, make up only 5% of the population of Liberia, but have historically 
dominated its intellectual and ruling class.  (from the Learning Network site 
www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107718.html). 
 
14 If we have the only modify the ex-Colony dummy variable by changing its value from 0 to 1 
for the US – Liberia dyad then the coefficient on the currency union dummy variable is 0.45 and 
the associated t-statistic is 0.25, resulting in a p-value of 0.076.   
 
15 See the appendix for a list of all the countries used in the regression analysis, including the 
breakdown into those that are non-industrial and those that are in the Western Hemisphere. 
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Glick and Rose ex-Colony variable), we see that most of the coefficients in Column II are 
quite close to their values in Column I.a, but the significance of the currency union 
dummy variable has now decreased such that its p-value is 0.126.
16   
A further refinement of the sample considers only trade between the United States 
and countries in the Western Hemisphere since these countries are the most likely 
candidates for a dollar currency union (as opposed to countries outside the Western 
Hemisphere that may be candidates for linking their currencies to the euro or some other 
currency).  The average level of trade in this sub-sample is more than triple the average 
level of trade between the United States and all non-industrial countries.  Column III of 
Table 3 presents the results of a regression in which one member of each dyad is the 
United States and the other member is a country in the Western Hemisphere.  This 
sample includes 764 observations, 12 percent of which represent currency unions, a 
figure that is much larger than in the other sub-samples.  While distance, the product of 
countries’ GDP, and common language retain their significance in this regression, the 
currency union dummy variable does not (nor do some of the other control variables). 
The p-value of the currency union dummy variable in this regression is 0.267.
17 
 
                                                 
16 If we include Liberia as an ex-Colony, the coefficient on the currency union dummy variable is 
0.28, with a standard error of 0.25, which implies a p-value of 0.267. 
 
17 The only industrial country trading with the United States in this sample is Canada.  If we 
exclude Canada from the Western Hemisphere sample, the average level of trade is $3,003,233 
thousand. In a regression with all Western Hemisphere countries but for Canada, the coefficient 
on the currency union dummy variable is 0.29, with a standard error of 0.27, resulting in a p-
value of 0.279.   
  11 
II. 3  Bilateral Trade of Countries Linked to the Dollar 
The results presented in the previous section cast doubt on whether the United 
States trades more with countries that have dollarized.  A related, though distinct, 
question is whether countries that have dollarized trade more with the United States than 
with other countries.  This question is addressed by the regression results in Table 4.  
Each column in this table reports a regression in which the observations are all the dyads 
that include the country listed at the head of the column.  These countries are the ones 
listed in Table 2 that had a currency union with the United States in the post-Bretton 
Wood era.  For reasons discussed in more detail below, we also include regressions 
representing Argentine trade in Table 4. 
The results in Table 4 provide little evidence that linking to the U.S. dollar 
promoted greater trade with the United States.
18  The only case where there is a positive 
and significant coefficient on the currency union dummy variable is for the Dominican 
Republic, in which case the estimated value of the coefficient is 0.83 and its associated p-
value is 0.06.  In the other two cases in which the estimated coefficient is positive, the 
Bahamas and Liberia, the p-values are 0.189 and 0.311, respectively.  The estimated 
coefficients on the currency union dummy variables are negative for the regressions for 
Bermuda, Guatemala and Panama, although none of the associated p-values are less than 
0.13.  
Table 4 does provide an example, however, of an estimated currency union 
coefficient that is both negative and significant (at better than the 10 percent level  of 
                                                 
18 Furthermore, one might expect that these countries were the most likely to have demonstrated 
trade benefits from a currency union since they did, in fact, choose to dollarize.  Alesina and 
Barro (2001) present a model in which the country that most gains from adopting the currency of 
another country is one that is small, open, and has its trade centered with one particularly large 
partner.    12 
confidence).  Argentina adopted the peso on January 1, 1992, with its value pegged to the 
United States dollar at a rate of one peso to one dollar.  This currency board continued 
until December 2001, four years beyond the end of the sample of trade data available to 
us.  The column labeled “Argentina” in Table 4 reports an estimate of a regression for all 
bilateral Argentine trade in which the currency union dummy variable is set equal to 1 for 
the years 1992 – 1997.  As shown in that column, the estimated coefficient on the 
currency union dummy variable is –0.57, with a standard error of 0.31, resulting in a p-
value of 0.068.
19   
 
II. 4  Dollarization Versus a Fixed Exchange Rate 
  Rose (2000) distinguishes between the effect of a currency union on trade and the 
effect of a fixed exchange rate on trade, writing “…a very stable exchange rate may not 
be the same as membership of a common currency area.  Sharing a common currency is a 
much more serious and durable commitment than a fixed rate.” (pp. 10-11).  Rose tests 
whether the effect of a currency union on trade goes beyond its effect on stabilizing the 
exchange rate by including various measures of exchange rate volatility, along with the 
currency union dummy variable and the other regressors discussed above, in the gravity 
trade equation.  Rose finds that exchange rate volatility enters the regression with a 
negative and significant coefficient.  More to the point, the coefficient on the currency 
union dummy variable is significant, even with the inclusion of exchange rate volatility 
as a regressor. 
                                                 
19 While the decision to adopt a currency board in Argentina reflected the policy goal of monetary 
stabilization rather than trade promotion, we might still have expected to see evidence of the 
latter. 
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  An alternative way to test whether there is a distinct difference between 
dollarizing and having a fixed exchange rate, one that allows us to address this issue more 
directly, is to include a separate dummy variable for a fixed exchange rate in the gravity 
regression.  While a relatively small number of countries dollarized, many more pegged 
their currencies to the U.S. dollar at some time during the post-Bretton Woods era.  Table 
5 presents all the observations among the data used in the regressions in which there was 
not a currency union but, nonetheless, there was a consecutive period of at least five 
years during which the respective U.S. dollar exchange rates varied by less than 1 percent 
each year.
20  As shown in Table 5, there are 508 dyads among the usable data that meet 
this criterion (recall from Table 2 that these data include 105 dyads in which there is a 
currency union with the United States).  These 508 dyads include 357 dyads between the 
United States and another country in the Western Hemisphere (as compared to 92 
currency union dyads), and 151 dyads between the United States and a country outside 
the Western Hemisphere, either in Africa or Asia (as compared to 13 currency union 
dyads).     
  In Table 6 we use these data on the occurrence of sustained fixed exchange rates 
to augment the gravity trade equation.  The regressions presented in Table 6 differ from 
those presented earlier in this paper through the inclusion of a dummy variable denoting 
the presence of a sustained fixed exchange rate that is not a currency union.  The columns 
represent results using different sub-samples of the data.  The data used to generate the 
                                                 
20 For ease of exposition, we refer to the currency behavior for the country – year pairs listed in 
Table 5 as fixed exchange rates, even though the dollar exchange rate may have moved by as 
much as 1 percent over the course of a year.  These data are from Shambaugh (2001) and were 
kindly provided by the author.  Shambaugh reports that a listing of annual exchange rate pegs 
based on actual behavior, like the one in Table 5, differs from a listing based on the reported IMF 
exchange rate status in only about 12% of the cases.  14 
results in Column I are all dyads pairing the United States with any other country, the 
data used in Column II includes all dyads between the United States and non-industrial 
countries, and the data used in Column III includes all dyads between the United States 
and other countries in the Western Hemisphere.  The regressions in Columns I and III of 
Table 6 are comparable to those presented in Columns I.b, and III of Table 3, 
respectively, while the regression reported in Column II in Table 6 is comparable to the 
one mentioned in footnote 16 in which the coefficient on the currency union dummy 
variable is 0.28, with a p-value of 0.267.
21 
  The results presented in Table 6 demonstrate that the augmentation of the 
regression specification with a dummy variable representing a fixed exchange rate 
increases the value of the coefficient on the currency union dummy variable and also 
makes this coefficient more significant.  For example, the coefficient on the currency 
union dummy variable for a sample of all bilateral United States trade is 0.35, with an 
associated p-value of 0.146, when the regression does not include a fixed exchange rate 
dummy variable (Table 3, Column I.b), and this coefficient is 0.53, with a p-value of 
0.039, when a fixed exchange rate dummy variable is included in the regression (Table 6, 
Column I).   But dollarization is not the only exchange rate arrangement that promotes 
trade in this sample, as the coefficient on the fixed exchange rate dummy variable is 0.40, 
with a p-value of 0.033.  Furthermore, we cannot distinguish between the effect of a 
currency union and the effect of a fixed exchange rate.  As shown in Column I of Table 6, 
the F-statistic testing the equality of the two coefficients is 0.32 and, with 3,404 degrees 
                                                 
21 The ex-Colony dummy variable in the regressions in Table 6 equals 1 for both United States – 
Philippines dyads and United States – Liberia dyads.  Recall that the ex-Colony dummy variable 
used in the regression reported in Column II of Table 3 equals 1 for the United States – 
Philippines dyad only.  15 
of freedom, the p-value for the hypothesis that these coefficients are equal is 0.57.  Thus, 
while both coefficients are significant in this sample, we cannot distinguish between them 
statistically and there is no significant evidence of a special dollarization effect on trade 
different from that of a sustained fixed exchange rate. 
  The results in Columns II and III in this table demonstrate that the coefficient on 
the currency union dummy variable in more narrowly defined samples is not significant 
at the 95 percent level, even though the inclusion of a dummy variable representing fixed 
exchange rates increases the size and significance of the currency union coefficient.   For 
a regression using a sample consisting of observations of United States bilateral trade 
with non-industrial countries, the coefficient on the currency union dummy variable is 
0.49 and the associated p-value is 0.093.  For a regression drawing on bilateral trade 
between the United States and countries in the Western Hemisphere, a sample that is 
focused on countries that are most likely to consider dollarization, the estimated 
coefficient on the currency union dummy variable is 0.39, with a p-value of 0.216.  In 
both of these cases, the coefficient on the fixed exchange rate dummy variable is 
statistically indistinguishable from the coefficient on the currency union dummy variable 
at standard levels of significance.  Thus, there is no evidence that the effects of 
dollarization on trade, to the extent that they exist at all, are distinct from the effects of a 
sustained fixed exchange rate on trade.  
 
II. 5  Dollarization Down Under 
  As shown in Table 2, Australia is the only industrial country other than the United 
States in the post-Bretton Woods era that has had a sustained currency union with more  16 
than one other country that has complete data and, therefore, can be included in the 
empirical analysis.  The currency of the Republic of Kiribati continues to be the 
Australian dollar while the Australian dollar was the currency of Tonga up until 1990 and 
of the Solomon Islands up through 1978.  All three of these countries are small island 
nations in the Western Pacific.  Each is a former colony of Britain.  Tonga became 
independent in 1970, the Solomon Islands in 1978, and the Republic of Kiribati in 1979.   
The estimated 2000 national income of these countries is $76 million for the Republic of 
Kiribati, $900 million for the Solomon Islands and $225 million for Tonga, and the 
estimated per capita national incomes are $850, $2,000 and $2,200, respectively.
22   
Table 7 presents estimates of gravity trade regressions for Australia to 
demonstrate the effect of currency unions on bilateral Australian trade.  Column I 
presents the results of a regression in which the observations represent all dyads that 
include Australia, while Column II presents the results of a regression in which each dyad 
includes Australia and a non-industrial country.  The coefficients on the currency union 
dummy variables in these regressions are quite large and significant at greater than the 
99.9 percent level.  The coefficient on the currency union dummy variable is 2.68 in the 
regression that uses all observations of Australian bilateral trade and 2.32 in the 
regression using only observations of trade between Australia and non-industrial 
countries.  These coefficients suggest that a non-industrial country that adopts the 
Australian dollar increases its trade with Australia by a factor of 10.18 (=exp(2.32)).  
Because this very large effect is based upon an estimate that draws on trade between 
Australia and three very small island nations, one might want to use some caution in 
                                                 
22 The information on these countries comes from the CIA World Factbook website, at 
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook.   17 
applying this result to other countries.  It is reasonable to be even more reticent to apply 
the estimate from the full-sample Australian bilateral trade regression, presented in 
Column I, that suggests that dollarizing (with the Australian currency) increases trade by 
a factor of 14.58 (=exp(2.68)). 
 
III.  Conclusion 
Proposals to dollarize economies are based on two goals, monetary stability and 
trade integration.  In this paper, we have shown that there is very little evidence that 
dollarization promotes trade with the United States for non-industrial countries.  This 
result contrasts with what one might infer from evidence presented in papers by Rose and 
co-authors that suggests that a currency union has the attractive property of promoting 
trade.  The source of the difference between the results in this paper and the results in the 
work by Rose and co-authors is that here we focus on samples that may better represent 
the behavior of potential candidates for dollarization.  This distinction is important given 
the possibility of parameter heterogeneity across samples.  In fact, we do find evidence of 
parameter instability, with differences in the estimated effect of currency unions on trade 
between a full sample and a sample centered on the United States, as well as between a 
sample centered on the United States and one centered on Australia.  If anything, we 
would expect these selective samples to be more likely to show evidence of a significant 
effect of dollarization on trade.  But we fail to find virtually any evidence that adopting 
the United States dollar as a national currency increases trade with the United States.  18 
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Table 1: Bilateral Trade Regressions  
  I. Trade Among All 
Countries 
II. Trade Between Industrial 
& Non-Industrial Countries  
Variable Coefficient  s.e.  Coefficient  s.e. 
Currency Union   1.52**  0.17   1.71**  0.51 
ln(distancei,j) -1.23**  0.03  -1.10**  0.04 
ln(GDPi x GDPj )   0.97**  0.10   0.99**  0.01 
ln(GDPpci x GDPpcj )   0.49**  0.02   0.44**  0.03 
Common Language   0.35**  0.05   0.58**  0.06 
Common Border   0.54**  0.13  -0.18  0.33 
Free Trade Agreement   0.86**  0.15   1.70**  0.56 
Landlocked -0.15**  0.04  -0.23**  0.05 
Island   0.04  0.04  -0.13* 0.06 
ln(Areai x Areaj ) -0.10**  0.01  -0.11**  0.01 
Common Colonizer   0.34**  0.08  -0.91**  0.21 
Current Colony   0.56  0.42   0.31  0.44 
ex-Colony   1.52**  0.13   1.31**  0.12 
Political Union  -0.62  0.90  -0.60  0.85 
p-value of CU coef.  0.000  0.001 
R
2  0.64 0.72 
no. of observations  152,960 65,059 
observations w/CU  1,783 175 
% of obs. w/CU  1.17% 0.27% 
Av’g. Trade ($ 000s)  $18,366 $51,523 




Table 2:  Post –1973 Currency Unions with Industrial Countries* 
United States  Australia  Portugal  France 
Bahamas, 1974 – ‘95  Kiribati, 1974 – ‘97  Angola, 1974 – ‘75  Réunion, 1976 – ‘89 
Bermuda, 1974 – ‘96  Solomon Isl., 1974 – ‘78  Cape Verde 1974 – ‘76 
Dominican Rep., 1974 – ’84   Tonga, 1975 – ‘90  Guinea-Bissau, 1974 – ‘76 
Guatemala, 1974 – ‘85  Mozambique, 1974 – ‘76 
Liberia, 1974 – ‘86 




105 dyads  45 dyads  11 dyads  14 dyads 
*Based on Glick and Rose (forthcoming), using dyads that have complete data and, therefore, are included in regressions 
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Table 3:  Bilateral United States Trade Regressions with Currency Union Dummy Variable 
I. With All Countries   
a. ex-Colonies as 
in Glick & Rose 
b. UK-US 
Dummy, Liberia 
as an ex-Colony 








Variable Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e. 
Currency  Union  0.50 0.27 0.35 0.24 0.44  0.29  0.30  0.27 
ln(distancei,j)  -1.04** 0.16 -1.06** 0.16 -1.05**  0.16  -1.32**  0.34 
ln(GDPi x GDPj )  0.91** 0.07 0.91** 0.06 0.92**  0.08  0.90**  0.14 
ln(GDPpci x GDPpcj )  0.42** 0.09 0.44** 0.09 0.43**  0.11  0.34**  0.21 
Common  Language  0.54** 0.14 0.53** 0.14 0.51**  0.16  0.97**  0.44 
Common Border  -0.35  0.37  -0.39   0.37  -0.72**  0.27  -0.84**  0.47 
Free  Trade  Agreement  0.88** 0.20 0.87** 0.19 0.94**  0.20  0.43  0.26 
Landlocked  -0.60** 0.20 -0.58** 0.20 -0.67**  0.23  -0.04  0.26 
Island  0.16 0.18 0.11 0.18 -0.03 0.24 -0.24 0.54 
ln(Areai x Areaj )  -0.004  0.06  -0.01  0.06 -0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.10 
ex-Colony  0.19  0.47 0.98** 0.22 0.93**  0.30     
US – UK bilateral dummy      -0.44*  0.20         
p-value of C.U. coef.  0.065  0.146  0.126  0.267 
R
2  0.84 0.80  0.80  0.92 
no. of observations  3441 3441  2870  764 
observations w/CU  105 105  105  92 
% of obs. w/CU  3.05% 3.05%  3.66%  12.04% 
Av’g. Trade ($ 000s)  $1,656,653 $1,002,272  $3,543,976 
** Significant at 99% level; * Significant at 95* level. 
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Table 4:  Bilateral Trade Regressions for Countries  
in a Currency Union with the US 
  Bahamas Bermuda  Dominican 
Republic 
Guatemala 
Currency  Union  1.38  1.05  -0.47 0.59 0.83 0.44 -0.70  0.47 
ln(distancei,j)  -0.54  0.31  -1.36** 0.28 -1.54** 0.21 -1.60**  0.20 
ln(GDPi x GDPj )  0.55**  0.20  1.05** 0.12 0.95** 0.12 1.07**  0.10 
ln(GDPpci x GDPpcj )  1.28**  0.29  0.95** 0.20 0.96** 0.20 0.87**  0.15 
Common  Language  0.07  0.49 1.12**  0.36 0.24 0.39 -0.20  0.37 
Common Border           -0.50  0.85  -0.84**  0.47 
Free  Trade  Agreement  0.26  0.56       2.35**  0.38 
Landlocked -0.77  0.56  1.03  0.58  -1.02*  0.50  -0.08  0.37 
Island  -0.06  0.50  0.98* 0.50 -0.45 0.48 -0.46  0.34 
ln(Areai x Areaj )  0.19  0.12  -0.13 0.12 -0.13 0.11  -0.22**  0.08 
Common  Colonizer  -0.45 0.65 -0.87  0.49         
Current  Colony      0.54  0.44       
ex-Colony  1.29*  0.59         
p-value of C.U. coef.  0.189  0.425  0.060  0.134 
R
2  0.46 0.53  0.53  0.63 
no. of observations  1717 1883  1733  1899 
No. of years w/CU  22 23  11  12 
continued 
  Liberia Panama  Argentina 
Currency  Union  0.49 0.49 -0.64 0.55 -0.57  0.31 
ln(distancei,j)  -1.07** 0.30 -1.16** 0.25 -1.46**  0.34 
ln(GDPi x GDPj )  1.41** 0.14 1.14** 0.14 1.18**  0.09 
ln(GDPpci x GDPpcj )  0.40  0.23 0.81** 0.19 0.48**  0.12 
Common Language  0.09  0.34  1.02*  0.43  0.07  0.31 
Common  Border  1.10  0.68   0.003 0.38  1.15 0.91 
Free Trade Agreement          0.07  0.56 
Landlocked  -0.03 0.70 -0.44 0.53  -0.75**  0.30 
Island  -0.55 0.56 -0.03 0.51  -0.56*  0.29 
ln(Areai x Areaj )  -0.49**  0.13 -0.23 0.13  -0.20**  0.06 
Common  Colonizer         
Current  Colony         
ex-Colony     -0.63  0.44  0.76**  0.26 
p-value of C.U. coef.  0.311  0.250  0.068 
R
2  0.54 0.58  0.71 
no. of observations  1043 2026  2831 
No. of years w/CU  13 24 6 
 
** Significant at 99% level; * Significant at 95* level. 
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Table 5: Countries Maintaining U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate Within 1 Percent Bands for 
Five or More Consecutive Years (not including Currency Unions)* 
Western Hemisphere  Africa and Asia 
Country Years  Country  Years 
Argentina  1992 – 1997  Bahrain  1979 – 1998 
Bolivia  1974 – 1978  Iraq  1974 – 1981, 1983 – 97 
Costa Rica  1975 – 1980  Oman  1974 – 1985, 1987 – 97 
Ecuador  1974 – 1981  Qatar  1980 – 2000 
El Salvador  1974 – 1985, 1994 – 1997  Saudi Arabia  1987 – 2000 
Haiti  1974 – 1990  Syria  1977 – 1987, 1989 – 97 
Honduras  1973 – 1989  United Arab Emir.   1981 – 1997 
Nicaragua  1973 – 1978, 1980 – 1984  Egypt  1980 – 1988, 1992 – 97  
Paraguay  1973 – 1983  Hong Kong  1984 – 1997 
Venezuela  1974 – 1983  South Korea  1975 – 1979 
Antigua & Barbuda  1977 – 2000  Pakistan  1974 – 1981 
Barbados  1976 – 2000  Djibouti  1974 – 1997 
Dominica  1977 – 2000  Angola  1977 – 1990 
Grenada  1977 – 2000  Burundi  1977 – 1982 
Belize  1978 – 2000  Ethiopia  1974 – 1991 
St. Kitts & Nevis  1977 – 2000   Libya  1974 – 1985 
St. Lucia  1977 – 2000  Nigeria  1994 – 1997 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines  1977 – 2000  Rwanda  1975 – 1982 
Suriname  1973 – 1993  Somalia  1974 – 1981 
Trinidad & Tobago  1977 – 1984  China  1995 – 1997 
357 dyads for Western Hemisphere  151 dyads for Africa and Asia 
                508 dyads total 
*Based on Shambaugh (2001), listing dyads for years in which there is complete data for regressions  
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Table 6:  Bilateral United States Trade Regressions with  
Currency Union and Fixed Exchange Rate Dummy Variables 
  I. With All 
Countries 
 








Variable Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e. 
Currency  Union  0.53*  0.26 0.49 0.29 0.39 0.31 
Fixed  Exchange  Rate  0.40*  0.19 0.36 0.21 0.11 0.13 
ln(distancei,j)  -0.99**  0.16 -1.00** 0.17 -1.30** 0.35 
ln(GDPi x GDPj )  0.92**  0.06 0.93** 0.08 0.92** 0.15 
ln(GDPpci x GDPpcj )  0.42**  0.09 0.40** 0.12 0.32** 0.22 
Common  Language  0.51**  0.14  0.49**  0.16 1.00* 0.46 
Common Border  -0.26  0.38  -0.61*  0.29  -0.83  0.47 
Free Trade Agreement  0.91**  0.21  1.03**  0.22  0.41  0.27 
Landlocked -0.57**  0.19  -0.65**  0.22  -0.04  0.26 
Island  0.16 0.17 0.04 0.23 -0.23 0.53 
ln(Areai x Areaj )  -0.0007  0.06  -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.10 
ex-Colony 0.94**  0.22  0.99**  0.25     
US – UK bilateral dummy  -0.36  0.20         
p-value of C.U. coef.  0.039  0.093  0.216 
p-value of Fixed e.r. coef.  0.033  0.080  0.402 
F-stat testing CU = Fixed  0.32  0.23  1.07 
R
2  0.85 0.80  0.92 
no. of observations  3441 2870  764 
observations w/CU  105 105  92 
% of obs. w/CU  3.05% 3.66% 12.04% 
obs. w/Fixed e.r. (not CU)  508 508  357 
% of obs. w/Fix e.r. (not CU)  14.76% 17.70%  46.73% 
** Significant at 99% level; * Significant at 95* level.  Ex-Colony dummy = 1 for US-
Philippines and US-Liberia dyads.  25 
 
Table 7 Bilateral Australian Trade Regressions  
  I. With All Countries  II. With Non-Industrial 
Countries Only 
Variable Coefficient  s.e.  Coefficient  s.e. 
Currency Union   2.68**  0.40   2.32**  0.41 
Ln(distancei,j) -2.72**  0.24  -2.92**  0.25 
Ln(GDPi x GDPj )   1.04**  0.08   1.01**  0.09 
Ln(GDPpci x GDPpcj )   0.87**  0.12   0.67**  0.14 
Common Language   0.56**  0.20   0.70**  0.23 
Free Trade Agreement   0.35  0.54   0.87**  0.11 
Landlocked -0.45  0.28  -0.66*  0.29 
Island   0.54*  0.27   0.58  0.32 
Ln(Areai x Areaj ) -0.07  0.06  -0.07  0.07 
Current Colony  0.06  0.55  0.25*  0.12 
Ex-Colony   1.32**  0.31   0.97*  0.47 
p-value of CU coef.  0.000  0.000 
R
2  0.82 0.77 
no. of observations  3342 2771 
observations w/CU  45 45 
% of obs. w/CU  1.35% 1.62% 
** Significant at 99% level; * Significant at 95* level.  26 
Appendix 
Countries Used in Regression Analysis 
 
Industrial Countries:  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia (n = 27) 
 
Non-Industrial Countries* that had complete data for estimating trade with U.S. 
and with Australia:  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Antigua & Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Grenada, Guyana, Belize, Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Bahrain, Cyprus, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab 
Emirates, Egypt, Republic of Yemen, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma (Myanmar), Sri 
Lanka, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Djibouti, Algeria, 
Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Benin, Equatorial 
Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Seychelles, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Namibia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Burkina 
Faso, Zambia, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Tonga, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrqyz Republic, Bulgaria, Moldova, China, 
Ukraine, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Mongolia, Slovenia,  Poland, Romania. (n = 138) 
 
Countries in italics are in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
* Non-industrial countries are those with an IMF IFS identification number greater than 
200.     
 
 